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It's a Wonderful Life, or is It?
America Without Judicial

Independence
PENNY J. WHITE*

In the movie It's a Wonderful Life, George Bailey is allowed to see what life in his hometown of Bedford Falls
would have been like had he never been born. That experience,
of viewing life without his existence, makes George keenly
aware of his significance. Perhaps from a similar viewpoint we
can envision an America without judicial independence and
evaluate its importance to our system of justice.
My present transition, unwelcomed as it was, is one that
has caused me to think a great deal about the privilege and the
importance of judging. I realize that what we all need to think
about and talk about as judges, lawyers, and citizens of the
greatest democracy in the world is not what happened on August 1, or what might happen in 1998, but what must happen
in every courtroom, in every classroom, and in our society
generally if we are to preserve this country's foundation of
three coequal and independent branches of government.
We hear talk of judicial independence. It is the post-election concern, the pre-election crisis, and the politically correct
description of what we want our judges to be. Yet, we see
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efforts all around us to circumvent it. There are criticisms from
one political candidate to another about judicial appointments,'
calls from presidents to judges questioning their decisions,2 and
senators' characterizations of the philosophies of judges.3 As
judges and lawyers, we fret about that phrase-judicial independence-while those in the other two branches often give it
mere lip service.
The willingness of one branch of government to attempt to
harness the power of another is nothing new. Remember
Marbury v. Madison,4 in which the United States Supreme
Court established its supremacy over Congress. In order to
"advise" the Court of the appropriate ruling, Congress passed
the Judicial Act of 1802 which abolished circuit judgeships
created by the Judicial Act of 1801, and in so doing, restored
circuit riding by the Supreme Court justices. More importantly,
to hold the Court at bay, the Act abolished the 1802 term of
Court.' Remember also the impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase for decisions he made as a circuit judge described at
the time as the "entering wedge to the compleat [sic] annihilation of our wise and independent Judiciary;" 6 the plank of the
Progressive Party in 1912, espoused by Theodore Roosevelt,
which advocated the recall of judicial opinions and judges by
popular vote;7 the FDR court packing plan;' the 1958 legisla1. Anthony Lewis, The Old Dole, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1996, at A5; Stephen B.
Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the
Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 774, 790
(1995).
2. Deborah Pines, Under Fire, Judge Reverses Himself, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15,
1996.
3. See Neal A. Lewis, GOP to Challenge JudicialNominees Who Oppose Death
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at A26, cited in Bright, supra note 1, at 790.
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. Harold R. Burton, Marbury v. Madison: The Cornerstone of Constitutional
Law, in THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 15-18 (Jesse H. Choper ed., 1987).
6. See COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS BEGINNINGS AND ITS JUSTIC-

ES 1790-1991 19 (1991); Trial of Samuel Chase, an American Justice of the Supreme

Court Impeached by the House of Representativesfor High Crimes and Misdemeanors
Before the Senate of the United States, 8th Cong., 2d Sess. (1805); see also Burton,
supra note 5, at 36-39.
7. See Paul A. Freund, Storms Over the Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT
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tion proposed by an Indiana senator which proposed denying
jurisdiction in a long list of cases including those involving
loyalty oaths and subversive activities; 9 and more recently in
1986, the discussion of impeachment of three court of appeals
judges who voted to overturn a murder conviction on what was
termed a technicality.'0 Finally, there is the present debate
over a constitutional amendment which would allow Congress
to overrule decisions of the United States Supreme Court by
legislative act."
The branches will always struggle to become omnipotent.
Thus, we must face this question: just how essential is judicial
independence to justice in America? Is it worth the struggle to
maintain the judiciary as the third, coequal, independent branch
of government? My reflection leads me to a simple conclusion:
judicial independence is the backbone of the American democracy. It is essential not only to the preservation of our system
of justice, but also to the preservation of our system of government.
Having made such an unconditional pronouncement, that
judicial independence is essential to preserving our nation, I
must be prepared to answer the obvious question. Why? Judicial independence has been described as "an essential safeguard
against the effects of the occasional ill humors in the society."12 Chief Justice John Marshall declared in an argument at
the Virginia Constitutional Convention: "I have always thought,
from my earliest youth . . . that the greatest scourge an angry
Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning people,
was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent Judiciary."' 3 And
AND ITS JUSTICES 185 (Jesse H. Choper ed., 1987).
8. See JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, MILESTONES! 200 YEARS OF AMERICAN LAW:
MILESTONES IN OUR LEGAL HISTORY 209-13 (1976).

9. See Freund, supra note 7, at 186. (Senator Jenner's (Indiana) plan almost succeeded but was foiled by Lyndon Johnson, then-Senate majority leader.)
10. See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Judicial Discipline: A
Legislative Perspective, 76 KY. L.J. 763, 779 (1988). See, e.g., Petitions Circulate to
Impeach Judges After Alday Ruling, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 3, 1986, at A15.
11. See, e.g., Stanley Mailman, Cutting Back on Hearings, Judicial Review,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 1996, at 3.
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 503 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle, ed., 1937).
13. John J. Parker, The JudicialOffice in the United States, 20 TENN. L. REv. 703,
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so, we are told of judicial independence and of its signifigance
to freedom and we utter the phrase frequently, but what is it?
Why is it of utmost importance?
Judicial independence is, simply put, the principle that
judges must be free to decide individual cases according to the
judge's view of the law and not public opinion about it. In a
more eloquent description rising from an 1871 opinion of the
United States Supreme Court, it is described as "a general
principle of the highest importance to the proper administration
of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising judicial authority,
shall be free to act upon his [or her] own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself [or
herself]. ' " In order to have judicial independence, the legal
system must protect its judges from outside pressures that
would force the judge to deviate from the judge's interpretation
of the law and the facts.
Historically, the principle of judicial independence originated in the legal system of England. There, judges were originally appointed to serve at the King's pleasure. When their
actions or decisions displeased the King, they were removed. 5
And so it was with Lord Coke, the distinguished jurist and
Chief Justice of the King's Bench, who was dismissed by
James I for not ruling as James thought he ought to rule. 6
Three kings following James I dismissed dozens of judges
whose rulings displeased them. It was indeed a common practice, understood by the judges, and the expedient ones governed themselves accordingly.
Finally, in 1688, the Glorious Revolution led to the deposing of King James II. After the coronation of King William
and Queen Mary, the Crown appointed judges to serve "during

706 (1949) (citing John Marshall's statement made during debate on the Virginia Constitutional Convention).
14. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
15. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF FREEDOM: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 121-23, 150, 190-91 (1967).
16. See id.; see also 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 440
(1st ed. 1932); COLIN RHYS LOVELL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY

333-35 (1962).
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good behavior."17 As a corollary to this necessary element of
judicial independence, the Crown endorsed a fixed salary for
judges so that neither Parliament nor the Crown could directly
or indirectly influence judges' decisions. 8
While these historical and academic statements about judicial independence may be somewhat helpful in our effort to
assess its signifigance to our system of justice, these examples
are not nearly as helpful as practical ones. When thinking
about judicial independence, what it is and how essential it
may be, it is perhaps more helpful to think about where we
would be without it.
Our courts would be quite different had judicial independence not been a foundation of our legal system. As we have
noted, no legislative acts would be subject to judicial review
because Chief Justice Marshall would have minded the Jefferson administration, which characterized Marbury v. Madison as
"a brazen attempt to induce the Supreme Court to interfere
unlawfully with the conduct of the Executive Branch of the
Government."' 9 Poll taxes, literacy tests, loyalty oaths, political gerrymandering, segregated public accommodations, and
lynchings would all have survived because the judiciary would
have been powerless to question, let alone invalidate, the actions of the legislative or executive branches.
Judges, prosecutors, police officers, and defense attorneys
would not have to worry about suppression motions because
without judicial independence, Mapp v. Ohio would never have
been decided.2" The Mapp decision virtually eliminated the
silver platter doctrine, where Federal agents who violated the
Constitution in their searches and seizures turned the evidence
over to the state prosecuting authorities "on a silver platter," or
helped state agents do the deed themselves because the Bill of
Rights only applied to federal government actions. Mapp was
unpopular. The media described the decision as "imposing bur17. 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195 (7th ed. 1956).
18. Act of 1 George III, 1 Geo. 3, ch. 23 (1760) (Eng.); Act of Settlement, 12 &
13 Will. 3, ch. 2, § 3 (1701) (Eng.).
19. Burton, supra note 5, at 17.
20. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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densome and unfruitful handicaps on the police."' 21 It was
against the will of the people for the Supreme Court to deem
those rights, or at least those in the fourth amendment, equally
applicable to the states.
Additionally, absent judicial independence, indigents would
not be provided with counsel unless required by state law, because the 1963 decision of Gideon v. Wainwright would not
have occurred.23 Juveniles would not have certain procedural
due process rights. 24 The Gideon and Gault decisions certainly
did not please the public. The rulings that hard-earned tax dollars must be used to provide legal counsel to poor adults and
juveniles accused of breaking into the homes of taxpayers,
assaulting them, and sometimes killing them were certainly
against the general public sentiment. Without judicial independence, our courts could avoid the backlog caused by a shortage
of public defenders because there would be no right to and no
need for lawyers for the poor.
Likewise, there would be no hearings to determine the admissibility of confessions. We could return to circumstances
such as those in Davis v. North Carolina where officers coerced confessions by depriving suspects of food and water and
by forcing them to run shackled alongside police cars. 5 We
would not question whether officers issued Miranda warnings
because, as you have guessed by now, there would be no such
thing as a Miranda26 warning-no need to determine whether
a confession was voluntary or whether it was extracted through
physical violence or intimidation.2 ' Had the Supreme Court in
1965 ruled according to general public opinion, based on the
whim of the American citizenry, there would be no Miranda
case, no need to advise defendants of their right to be free
from self-incrimination, and no need to determine whether the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 292.
See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-59.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
In re Gault, 384 U.S. 997 (1966).
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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confession given was voluntary and admissible.
Now, before this America without judicial independence
sounds enticing, or at least a lot less complicated, let me remind you of a few other omissions from our courtrooms. Many
civil cases would be nonexistent because the legislature would
have subsumed many private and public corporations. Why?
Because the public pressure against the decision reached in the
1819 case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward' would have
been great enough to deter the court from enforcing the right
to contract clause against state governments. In fact, historians
suggest that courts would barely have civil dockets because the
absence of the Dartmouth College opinion from American
jurisprudence would have meant that the American economy
would never have prospered; private business would have
feared the encroachment of government and would have been
reluctant to invest capital to build and stimulate the economy.2 9 Likewise, had the Court not stymied the state's taxation
attempts in McCullough v. Maryland,3" our economy would
certainly have evolved differently, if it evolved at all.
What about the few civil cases that remain? None would
involve African American litigants. The public sentiment which
led the Court to make the Dred Scott3 decision, depriving
African Americans of their standing as citizens, would have
continued to sway the courts. The public outcry which followed
Brown v. Board of Education32 would have been anticipated,
and as a result, the ruling would not have been made. The
Civil War amendments would have remained hollow, and our
country would remain as divided as it was in 1857 when the
Court handed down the Dred Scott decision.33
Without judicial independence, circuit judges would not
have to worry about Batson3 4 challenges to juries, the line of

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

17 U.S. 518 (1819).
See LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 111-15.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857).
349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 276-81.
See LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 280-81.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98-100 (1986).
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cases which prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to strike
women and minorities from the jury.3 5 There would be no
Batson challenge because there would be no minority or female
jurors. Taylor v. Louisiana36 and numerous other decisions
would never have been reached because the public pressure to
keep juries all white and all male would have defeated the
notion that judges ought to apply the law equally and fairly.
There are numerous other examples of what America would
look like without judicial independence. Courts from the highest to the lowest in this land have made decisions throughout
our history that were unpopular, unaccepted, and unenforced.
That is important for us to remember. Moreover, it is important
that we support courageous and independent judges so that they
do not fall victim to the clamor of an excited people, the tyranny of public opinion. It is essential that we as citizens undergird them with the strength to uphold the promise of equal
justice under law.
I have realized something only recently that is as important
as our recognition of courageous judges. Equally as important
as the recognition of courageous judges is the recognition of
courageous advocates. It is, in most cases, the courageous
advocate that empowers the judge to be courageous. I have
discovered that in almost every case which illustrates the principles of judicial independence and judicial courage, the courageous judicial decision is preceded, and I would suggest
prompted, by courageous advocacy. In almost every case that I
have mentioned, in almost every case that comes to mind when
you think about courageous, independent judges, there is a courageous advocate standing on the other side of the bench.
My claim is not hyperbole. Who argued the case of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward in the United States Supreme
Court? Daniel Webster.37 Who argued Gideon v. Wainwright?

35. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
36. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
37. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); see also
LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 95-115.
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Abe Fortas, a Tennessean who went on to serve as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1965 until
1969, argued the case.38 And, Thurgood Marshall argued
Brown v. The Board of Education before serving twenty-three
distinguished years on the United States Supreme Court.39
History is replete with other examples of courageous advocacy resulting in courageous verdicts and decisions in the face
of tyrannous public opinion. John Adams and Josiah Quincy
defended Captain Preston in Boston despite criticisms that they
were British sympathizers and opponents of American independence. In a letter to his father who questioned his decision to
become an "advocate for those criminals charged with murdering their fellow citizens," Josiah Quincy replied:
Let such be told, Sir, that these criminals, charged with
murder, are not yet legally proven guilty, and therefore,
however criminal, are entitled by the laws of God and man
to all legal counsel and aid; that my duty as a man
obliged me to undertake; that my duty as a lawyer
strengthened the obligation. I never harbored the expectation nor any great desire that all men should speak well
of me. To inquire my duty, and do it, is my aim.4"
We can only assume that Adams' and Quincy's in-court advocacy was as strong; the Boston jury acquitted.
In the case of Leopold and Loeb, despite the heinousness
of the crime, the uselessness of the death of the two victims,
the outcry of the public against the two wealthy, spoiled geniuses, Clarence Darrow convinced the judge that justice required a life sentence instead of a death sentence: "It is not for
these boys for whom I argue, it is for the infinite number who
are to follow, those who can't be as well defended, those who
will go through the tempest without the aid of counsel."'"

38. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 180-83 (1990).
39. RANDALL W. BLAND, PRIVATE PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAW: THE LEGAL CAREER OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 82-87 (1973).
40. Letter from Josiah Quincy, Jr. to Josiah Quincy (March 26, 1770) (copy on file
with the author).
41. JAMES J. BROSNAHAN, GREAT TRIALS AND GREAT TRIAL LAWYERS, (The

Teaching Company 1994) (the superstar teachers audiotape series).
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If courageous advocates make courageous judges, the absence of courageous advocates encourages timidity on the
bench. This has led to some of our country's darkest hours. In
Salem, when public hysteria attached to the idea of witchcraft,
two hundred people, most of them women, were hanged after
being found guilty of witchcraft by white male juries.42 Almost none of those accused were represented by counsel.
Today, judges sling nooses over trees in the courthouse
lawn in election years, set execution dates as birthday presents
for their clerks, and sign death warrants with smiley faces.43
One Florida judge, Richard Stanley, announced that he would
go along with the system so long as he was allowed, "right
after I pronounce the sentence to reach down by my left leg,
come up with my pistol, and shoot 'em right between the
eyes."" The most often used advocate in capital cases in a
certain Texas county is an attorney credited with hurrying
through capital trials and consequently earning the nickname
"greased lightning." He is said to be a favorite among the
judges because of the manner in which he expedites capital
cases. Ten of his capital clients are on death row.45
Compare the above examples to Clarence Darrow, who lost
one death penalty case out of the one hundred he tried.46 I do
not hold us all to the standard of trial advocacy of Clarence
Darrow. I do, however, hold us all, each and every one of us,
to a degree of courage which will inspire those men and women on the bench who want desperately to do the right thing to
have the strength to do it. Advocates must provide the muscle,
the strength, the stamina, and the courage which will enable
judges, despite public clamor, to do the often difficult but
42. Id.
43. R. Dieter, Killing for Votes: The Political Use of the Death Penalty, Death
Penalty Information Center, Washington, D.C. 9-12 (1996) (on file with the author).
44. See John McKinnon & John Pancake, Shift in the Law Too Late to Benefit
Killer, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 28, 1995, at Al; Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1487
n.6 (11 th Cir. 1995).
45. R. Dieter, With Justicefor Few: The Growing Crisis in Death Penalty Representation, Death Penalty Information Center, Washington, D.C. 9-10 (1995) (on file
with the author).
46. Id.
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nonetheless, right thing.
It is not just the Clarence Darrows and Thurgood
Marshalls that inspire courageous judges. It is the lawyer that
travels from Tennessee to Alabama to defend the Scottsboro
boys when an Alabama judge had appointed the entire county
bar knowing no one would dare come forward to defend minority youths charged with raping a young white girl;47 it is
the solo practitioner who dares to challenge the corporate defendant for the rights of consumers; it is the legal services'
attorney who takes on the housing department for racial discrimination; and potentially, it is you.
Courageous advocates make courageous judges. This courage infiltrates the proceedings, breeds fairness, and strengthens
the judge who is desirous of doing the right thing.
Let us adhere to the principle that the surest way for the
law to lose its force in a democracy is for the people to have
no understanding of it.4" Let us each strive to educate our
communities about judicial courage and independence. Let us
remind the public that unlike the federal judges chosen as symbols of judicial courage for this First Monday program, our
state court judges do not have the luxury of life-time appointments.4 9 Nonetheless, they have identical obligations: to be
courageous and to be independent.
All judges face the likelihood of being publicly criticized,
ostracized, and attacked for decisions they must make. Let us
remind the public that a judiciary who looks to another branch
of government to be told how to rule on important legal and
social issues is not doing its job and is risking the freedom of
us all. Let us explain why a judge that publicly promises in
advance to rule in a certain way on a particular issue is not
judging, is not worthy of judging, but is simply politicking. 0

47. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at 314-17; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 587,
599 (1935).
48. LIEBERMAN, supra note 8, at viii-ix.
49. See Bright, supra note 1, at 776-80.
50. During his address to the American Bar Association in Florida in August 1996,
Justice John Paul Stevens stated: "A campaign promise to be 'tough on crime,' or to
'enforce the death penalty' is evidence of bias that should disqualify a candidate from

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 27

Let us explain to our citizens that the only people who benefit
from a judge who looks over his or her shoulder are those that
are standing behind the correct shoulder at the moment that the
judge chooses to look and then only if the judge is not blind
or deaf to that individual's cause. Let us remind the public that
those who wish for judges to rule based on majority public
opinion have never been in the minority, have never been female, have never been Hispanic, have never been Jewish. Finally, let us remind the public of the words in Absalom and
Achitophel: "Nor is the people's judgment always true; the
most may err as grossly as the few."'"
Let us be mindful of what our country would have been
without judicial courage and independence and let us pledge to
be the kind of advocates that make brave judges: courageous
and creative advocates who lead judges desirous of doing the
right thing to the sometimes difficult but always right result.
As Judge John Parker said: "It is of supreme importance
not only that justice be done, but that the litigants before the
court and the public generally understand that it is being done
and that the judge is beholden to no one but God and his [or
her] conscience."52
Let us strengthen the American judiciary through our courageous advocacy so that judges may each stand as symbols of
judicial courage and independence, who go about doing justice
beholden unto no one but their God and their conscience and
upholding the promise of equal justice under the law for one
and all.

sitting in criminal cases." Justice Blasts State Election of Judges, TAMPA TRIBUNE,
August 4, 1996, at 16.
51. John Dryden, Absalom and Achitophel, reprinted in THE POEMS OF JOHN
DRYDEN 59, lines 781-82 (John Sargeaunt, ed.) (1913).
52. Judge John Parker, supra note 13, at 705-06.

